The airplane had two primary hydraulic systems-“flight” hydraulics and “combined” hydraulics-and either one alone was capable of providing full flight control. Hydraulics powered the A-6’s flight controls, landing gear, the mechanism to retract the tail hook, and a variety of peripherals. When the airplane returned to the flight schedule after a three-week hiatus, it was immediately clear that something was wrong with the hydraulics.
At last, 510 was back in action, and Gonzales and his airframes shop turned their attention to other aging jets. They eventually diagnosed a wiring fault in the wing that caused the speed brakes to fail. Once home, Gonzales called in the experts of the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit to address the speed-brake problem. It was readily repaired and quickly forgotten. It was cobbled back together and flown by a test crew every 30 days.ĭuring its time as a parts bird, 510 presented an entirely different problem: A rigid pressure line in its backup hydraulic pump sprang a leak. Eventually, 510 was tucked in a corner of the hangar bay to become a source of spare parts. “Throughout the cruise, it could only be flown by test pilots,” Gonzales says. Gonzales assigned one of his most experienced airframe mechanics to 510 nearly full time. Despite the maintenance department’s best efforts, 510’s speed brakes were still acting up when VA-145 put to sea in February 1989. VA-145 was about to begin a six-month Western Pacific/Indian Ocean cruise aboard the USS Ranger. Still, the speed brakes performed reliably-until, in flight, when it mattered, they didn’t. They sprayed carbon dioxide fire extinguishers on suspect components to mimic the super-cold temperatures at altitude. Gonzales’s airframes mechanics jacked up the wings to simulate the effect of lift. When problems encountered airborne can’t be readily diagnosed, technicians sometimes seek to replicate stresses aircraft experience in flight. Whenever they tested them, the speed brakes worked fine. The sailors in the squadron’s airframes shop couldn’t pinpoint the problem. Gradually, 510’s speed brakes began to fail more frequently. Their retraction offers a velocity increase much faster than the throttle and makes aborted approaches, or “wave-offs,” safer. In the landing configuration, they allow the pilot to carry more power without increasing speed. Extendable wingtip surfaces, speed brakes slow the aircraft rapidly. To him it embodied the toughness that earned Grumman the nickname “The Iron Works.” He found A-6 malfunctions generally honest and their solutions straightforward-until 1988, when, at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island north of Seattle, he encountered 510.Īt first, the airplane’s problems were minor. Chief Warrant Officer Al Gonzales, who was the maintenance matériel control officer for Navy Attack Squadron 145, recalls: “I’d had a bad feeling about this airplane the moment I laid eyes on it.” It had arrived at the squadron in pieces. That’s what A-6 Intruder NE 510 was for my squadron mates and me-an inexplicable menace that stalked our aircrew and defied our maintenance department. The gremlin-plagued airplane is a standard of aviation lore.